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The article aims to analyze whether, after 30 years of current Brazilian democracy, 
political institutions will be resilient enough to deal with the consequences of an 
authoritarian government elected in the middle of a deep representation crisis. 
In other words, would this be a turn to an illiberal democracy? From an analysis of the 
situation, we traced a chronology of circumstances – transition from the authoritarian 
regime, popular dissatisfaction, critical elections of 2018 as a time of exhaustion for 
the New Republic, dynamics of the party dispute – that converged to the rise of ultra-
right forces, elected through a democratic regime. Data referring to public perception 
concerning institutions, electoral results, and performance of traditional parties in 
recent electoral cycles (general election of 2018 and municipal election of 2020) are 
analyzed. We conclude that the growth of center-right parties in the 2020 municipal 
elections indicate that – despite the analytical correctness of the literature on the 
possibility of internal corrosion of democracies by nationalist neopopulism – the thesis 
regarding incidental rulers has strong evidence visible in Brazil.
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RESUMEN
El artículo pretende analizar si, tras 30 años de la actual democracia brasileña, las 
instituciones políticas serán lo suficientemente resistentes como para afrontar las 
consecuencias de un gobierno autoritario elegido en medio de una profunda crisis 
de representación. En otras palabras, ¿se trataría de un giro hacia una democracia 
antiliberal? A partir de un análisis de coyuntura, trazamos una cronología de 
circunstancias –transición del régimen autoritario, insatisfacción popular, elecciones 
críticas de 2018 como momento de agotamiento de la Nueva República, dinámica 
de la disputa partidaria– que confluyeron al ascenso de fuerzas de ultraderecha, 
elegidas en el marco de un régimen democrático. Se analizan los datos referidos a la 
percepción pública sobre las instituciones, los resultados electorales y el desempeño 
de los partidos tradicionales en los últimos ciclos electorales (elecciones generales 
de 2018 y municipales de 2020). Concluimos que el crecimiento de los partidos 
de centroderecha en las elecciones municipales de 2020 indica que – a pesar de la 
corrección analítica de la literatura sobre la posibilidad de corrosión interna de las 
democracias por el neopopulismo nacionalista – la tesis relativa a los gobernantes 
incidentales tiene fuertes indicios de mostrarse en Brasil.
PALABRAS CLAVE: democracia brasileña, gobierno de Bolsonaro, sistema de 
partidos, retroceso democrático, reajuste electoral, elección crítica. 
Introduction1
The results of the 2018 elections, with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro as president 
of the Republic, questioned the future of democracy in Brazil, which had begun 
to consolidate itself around the 80s through a transition that gave rise to an insti-
tutional arrangement denominated as the “New Republic”. Although the “anti-
PT-ism” exercised had an important role in the behavior of electors who did not 
identify themselves with PT, the work of Jairo Nicolau points to a generalized 
dissatisfaction of the population in all levels of income, age, and education. Even 
though Nicolau’s work provides, as a backdrop, a discussion about political cul-
ture, this work will concentrate its focus on institutional dynamics, having been 
seen that, as warns Przeworski, despite the fact that democracies need demo-
crats, the relationship of cause and effect between questions and answers related 
to belief in the democracy gives rise to controversies (Przeworski, 2019, p. 129).
In other words, the question is if Brazilian democratic institutions will be 
resilient enough to face the consequences of an authoritarian government, 
1  This paper is fruit of research funded by the National Council of Scientific and Technolo-
gical Development (CNPq) through a Productivity Grant.
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elected amid a representative crisis, or if it is a turn in the direction of a low-
quality democracy – or illiberal democracy, a term adopted in recent litera-
ture. Such questioning necessarily goes through the debate and analysis of 
party disputes, which is par excellence a form of the expression of “general 
will”. Nevertheless, the analysis of an electoral dispute does not exempt the 
analysts from the task of contextualizing the elections with a theoretical and 
historical backdrop that sets the stage of the dispute and puts it in a broader 
perspective, placing it – using the term coined by Huntington – in a wave that 
brings with it a demonstration effect.2
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the 2018 election, which broke 
the polarization between the two main parties, PT and PSDB, caused the di-
vorce between society and the political system. Its peak were the protests of 
2013, accentuated by the investigations of Car Wash Operation, and it was 
consummated by the questioning of the 2014 electoral result. To measure the 
disruptive depth of 2018, we will confront the performance of the main par-
ties elected to Congress, along with the results for mayoral and city halls and 
city council elections in twenty-seven capitals. Therefore, if there is proof of 
a steep decline in the number of traditional parties in 2020, we can affirm that 
the rise of Bolsonarism was a movement of tectonic plates towards a regime of 
different nature than a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional par-
ties in 2020 is verified, we can classify Bolsonarism – at least the most extreme 
form of it – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental rulers” 
(Abranches, 2020).
For the author, incidental governments are products of popular uprisings 
against the established parties that lose their connection with society and fall 
short of the expectations, mainly, of those who are in a less favorable position 
in a market economy system. Such incidental governments are supported by 
unstable majorities in parliament, in the case of parliamentarism, or around 
a leadership that gains popularity in a critical election. Being “incidental”, the 
rulers generally are not elected to a second term and, therefore, an authoritar-
ian regime does not come to fruition. However, their time in power tends to 
leave a legacy of discreditation of democracy (Abranches, 2020, pp. 77–96).
From controversial congressman belonging to the lower clergy to president 
of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro was notable for his aggressive, prejudiced and 
far-right speech. Always emphasizing obscure passages of the military regime, 
throughout his terms, now in the exercise of the presidency of the Republic, 
Bolsonaro approaches a kind of “antigeisel”, trying to promote a slow, gradual, 
but not always safe closure. However, given the thickening of the political and 
health crisis, the chances of Bolsonaro becoming an incidental elected official 
in a critical election are great.
2  The first wave of democratization was in the period between the end of the 19th century 
and the beginning of World War 1. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: The Democrati-




We divided this discussion into five sections. After the introduction, in the 
second section, we delimited the historical and theoretical debate to discuss 
the principal approaches regarding the risks of the current democracy in the 
context of Bolsonaro’s election. In the third section, we laid out a panorama 
of the public perception of institutions and the implications for the dynamics 
of political polarization. In the fourth part, we seek to empirically test our hy-
pothesis taking into consideration the results of the 2018 and 2020 elections. 
Finally, in the fifth section, we present our final considerations.  
From transition to instability: the background 
of an authoritarian electoral option
Many authors have faced the challenge of conceptualizing the diverse regimes 
that, in one way or another, mix authoritarian components with a democratic 
façade. This challenge intensified with the election of Trump and Bolsonaro, 
and that, according to Przeworski, left us a warning that the democratic in-
stitutions may not offer the necessary safeguards to prevent their rules from 
being subverted by the duly elected rulers. (Przeworski, 2019, p. 19). 
Among the attempts to conceptualize the current regimes that distance 
themselves from what is considered a prerequisite for free and complete de-
mocracies, perhaps the most fruitful endeavor was undertaken in the 1990s 
by Fred Zakaria when he coined the term “illiberal” to characterize regimes of 
peripheral countries that had, as their modus operandi, the systematic viola-
tions of civil liberties, freedom of speech, corruption, and fraudulent elections 
(Zakaria, 1997).  The idea that democracy can erode from within resounds 
in the work of Levitsky and Zibblatt (2018), in their analysis of the election 
of Donald Trump, and Albertus Menaldo (2018) in regard to democracies in 
consolidation.
Levitsky and Ziblatt formulate a series of indicators seeking to measure 
what characterizes as a contemporary demagogue. Among these indicators 
are the disdain for the “rules of the game”, the attempt to delegitimize the op-
ponent, the tolerance for, or encouraging of, violence and restrictions on the 
exercise of civil liberties. According to the authors, this would be the authori-
tarianism that would install itself in the United States and that would parallel 
the ascension of Mussolini and Hitler. All exaggerations aside – principally 
concerning the American democracy – it is necessary to recognize the suc-
cessful finding that the military coups or great revolutions belong, at least for 
the moment, to the past. On the other hand, it seems irrefutable that the in-
stitutional antibodies developed by democracies are the result of the distinct 
historical processes of institutional enrooting, and therefore, each democracy 
will produce a different reaction. 
In the same line of reasoning, Albertus and Menaldo (2018), with a broad-
er comparative scope point out, like Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), the silent 
23
Incomplete Democracies:  
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
establishment of authoritarian regimes, but they also emphasize the role of the 
political elite. According to them, such institutions are designed to safeguard 
the members of the authoritarian regime. This reasoning leads Albertus and 
Menaldo to counterpose an elite-based democracy and a popular democracy. 
A democracy based on the elite is one whose institutions and legal framework 
limit the distributive responsibilities and, in some way, restrict competition. 
On the other hand, a popular democracy would ensure a more efficient de-
mocratization process in which the “authoritarian rubble” is nullified. 
On the other hand, the concept of national populism, as expressed by Rog-
er Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin (2020), offers a less catastrophic perspective 
for democracy. For the authors, national populism is an answer to the wari-
ness of what is considered “traditional” politics (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2020, 
p. 130). The origin of national populism is in the distrust caused by the elitist 
nature of liberal democracy, the insecurity caused by the migratory waves, the 
sense of deprivation brought on by the neoliberal globalized economy and by 
the misalignment between traditional parties and society (Eatwell & Good-
win, 2020, pp. 20–22). 
In the Brazilian case, we have a transition initiated “from the top” with 
the indirect election of General Geisel in 1974. A member of the moderate 
line, Geisel, along with Golbery, noticed the erosion of the legitimacy of the 
authoritarian regime, even though the economy was growing at an accelerated 
rate. Nevertheless, according to Chirio (2012), the transition initiated by Gei-
sel was not aimed exactly at democratization, but at “distension” to neutralize 
the arbitrariness committed by the hard-liners and the institutionalization of 
a hybrid regime, in which the representative practice did not threaten the po-
litical limits granted on the basis of an authoritarian ideal. 
In order to put an end to the distension, Geisel had to maintain the elec-
toral calendar and, on another front, face the regime’s hard-liners. The legisla-
tive elections of 1974 and 1978 were moments of great uncertainty regarding 
the continuity of the process of opening of the authoritarian regime, since the 
victory of the opposition in the most developed regions of Brazil threatened 
the government’s majority in the National Congress. In the case of a controlled 
opening, the elections became the main institutionalized channel for contest-
ing the regime, and, for this very reason, a constant source of rule changes so 
that the opposition would not obtain an overwhelming victory in the legisla-
tive elections. 
On the other hand, even if the hotspots of guerilla movements had been 
done away with in the Costa e Silva and Médici governments, hardline sectors 
(sectors that the current President Jair Bolsonaro is sympathetic to) continu-
ously expressed their dissatisfaction with the opening of the dictatorship, first 
with the murder of the journalist Wladimir Herzog and a worker named Ma-
noel Fiel Filho in 1975, then with several bomb attacks during the Figueiredo 





The New Republic arises from this tension within the military regime and 
from a transition that preserved the institutional foundations of the political 
regime and that allowed the majority of the political elite from the previous 
regime to remain at the head of the public administration. It is in line with the 
Albertus and Menaldo’s thesis about the influence of elites from the previous 
regime on the institutionalization of the new democracy. According to Souza 
(1988) and Diniz (1997), skepticism regarding the prospects of a democratic 
consolidation was justified by the characteristics of institutional continuity 
and little social representativity of political parties.
Although several academic papers, produced during the second half of 
the 1990s and early 2000s, have verified, based on solid statistical models, the 
strengthening of rules and intra-institutional mechanisms3, the carelessness 
with historical and social processes did not allow due attention to be given 
to the fact that the short period of political stability experienced in the New 
Republic was achieved thanks to the ability to manage large coalitions dur-
ing the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and Luís 
Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010). The first stabilized the economy – while still 
Minister of Finance of Itamar Franco – and began to build the foundations 
of a regulatory state, and the latter – benefited from the stabilization of the 
economy – expanded income distribution and social inclusion.
The sixteen years of political and economic stability (Cardoso / Lula pe-
riod) were preceded and followed by two impeachments of presidents who 
failed to manage coalitions (Collor, 1992 and Rousseff, 2016), a high degree 
of party/parliament fragmentation, unemployment, recession, and corruption 
scandals that reveal the persistence of promiscuous relationships between par-
ties, the state, and the private sector.
The polarization of the presidential elections, from 1994 to 2014 between 
PT and PSDB, did not minimize the spread of acronyms present in the general 
elections. The same strategy of “dividing oppositions to govern”, devised by 
Golbery do Couto e Silva, when he put an end to bipartisanship in 1979, was 
used by Rousseff aiming at the destabilization of the PMDB, which, since the 
re-democratization, had been the center of governance and, therefore, essen-
tial in coalitions.
The strategy, which had not worked out in the authoritarian period, was 
even worse under the democratic regime. The attempt to use the governmen-
tal machine to stimulate the creation of new parties increased the price of ne-
gotiations between the executive and the legislature precisely at the time when 
the expansion of government spending had reached its limit, which made it 
3  The studies produced under the aegis of neo-institutionalism began by focusing on the in-
ternal dynamics of the House of Congress (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999) passing through the con-
nections between the offices of ministers and electoral performance – suggesting the existence of 
a vicious cycle (Meneguello, 1998; Santos, 2003), and lastly sought to understand the dynamics of 
the changing of parties and coalitions (among others see Melo, 2004; Krause et al., 2017).
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impossible to maintain public policies aimed at social inclusion and caused an 
intense economic recession.
The rupture of society with the channels of political representation oc-
curred in 2013, with large popular demonstrations mobilized by social net-
works in the style of the “Arab Spring” and, as observed in the rest of the 
world, showed the decline of institutionalized channels of political representa-
tion. However, notwithstanding other exogenous factors, in 2013 the inabil-
ity of the Brazilian political system to consolidate accountability mechanisms 
that allow for a minimum level of accountability between government and 
governed was an endogenic factor. What followed was the implosion of the 
political parties’ funding mechanisms, the protagonism of players who did not 
have elective mandates, such as prosecutors and magistrates, and the desper-
ate attempt to maintain a political system that no longer even looked at the 
electorate.
It is in this context that the 2018 election takes place, with a weakening 
participation of the center parties and the confrontation between the left and 
the extreme right, each highly ideological, in Przeworski’s words, each side 
believing that the other is the enemy to be destroyed at any cost (Przeworski, 
2020, p. 45).
Political discontent: a brief overview of public 
perception of institutions
Trust in the political system is directly linked to its capacity to respond to the 
needs and expectations of society. Thus, the recognition of its democratic le-
gitimacy, on the part of society, depends on the performance of its institutions. 
In other words, institutions only exist inasmuch as people believe in their le-
gitimacy.4 But trust in governments and satisfaction with the democratic re-
gime are not the only sources of legitimacy in the political system, – there is 
also a need for free, periodic, and competitive elections (Dahl, 1997; Schum-
peter, 1961). In any case, citizens’ assessment of the institutions’ performance 
is key to understanding the support for democratic norms in the country. 
In this section, we assess the Brazilian population’s perception of the func-
tioning of the democratic regime and political institutions through survey 
from the Brazilian Electoral Study5 (ESEB). More specifically, the degree of 
public satisfaction with democracy and the evaluation of Brazilians regarding 
4  In general terms, the legitimacy of democratic institutions can be considered as “the belief 
that the political institutions in place, despite their defects and flaws, are better than others that 
may be established and, therefore, can demand obedience” (Linz, 1978, p. 16).
5  The ESEB is a post-election survey of academic nature associated with the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems project of the University of Michigan, coordinated by the political 




the performance of political institutions for the period between 2010 and 2018 
will be assessed. Table 1 shows citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of 
Brazilian democracy based on ESEB three-wave data.
2010 (%) 2014 (%) 2018 (%)
Very satisfied / satisfied 48 38.1 12.3
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 17.5 20.8 4.8
A little satisfied/ not at all satisfied 30 35.9 80.2
DK / NR 4.5 5.2 2.7
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.
In fact, Brazilian democracy does not live its best moments. According to 
the data, there is a decline in citizens’ satisfaction with the functioning of de-
mocracy and a significant increase among those who declare themselves dis-
satisfied. Only 12% of respondents affirmed they were satisfied with the per-
formance of democracy in 2018, a drop of 36 percentage points compared to 
the survey carried out in 2010, while 80% of respondents declared themselves 
dissatisfied in the 2018 survey, which represents an increase of 50% compared 
to 2010. Although satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is shaken, 
in general, most citizens do not endorse authoritarian regimes, as shown in 
Table 2. 
2010 (%) 2014 (%) 2018 (%)
Democracy is always better than any other 
form of government
78.4 62.1 68.7
In some situations, a dictatorship is better 
than a democracy
8.2 10.3 15.2
It does not matter 5.3 8.6 5.3
DK / NR 8.1 19.0 10.8
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018.
Despite the high preference for democracy, in almost a decade, there was 
a decrease of ten percentage points in the rate of those who prefer a demo-
cratic regime to an authoritarian alternative. The number of those who express 
preferences for authoritarian regimes has also increased, although it is still 
only a small part of the population. In contrast to the high levels of preference 
for democracy, the high dissatisfaction with it is complemented by the nega-
tive evaluations regarding the performance of political institutions, which rep-









Incomplete Democracies:  
The Brazilian Case
Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga
Gustavo Muller
Marcus Corrêa Rodrigues
Source: elaborated on the basis of ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. The question of the survey: 
“How do you evaluate the performance of (...)?”. In the values, those who answered excellent 
and good were added; average positive and negative regular; bad and very bad; and did not 




ians evaluated the performance of the following institutions: political parties, 
National Congress, presidency, judiciary, and armed forces.
As the figures show, there is an increasing tendency in the rejection of rep-
resentative institutions over the years. Political parties and the National Con-
gress are the institutions whose performance is the most poorly evaluated. The 
percentage of those who think the performance is bad/very bad continues to 
grow over time and exceeds 60% in 2018, while the rate of those who consider 
it excellent/good does not reach 20% for both. The performance of the federal 
government, on the other hand, shows lower levels of rejection than those 
observed for parties and Congress, although the rate of those who find the 
federal government bad/very bad has been increasing over time, exceeding 
40% in 2018. The judiciary, in the year 2018, presented a positive rating (43%) 
close to the rejection rating (35%), but what calls the attention is that during 
the historical series there is a decrease in the frequency of those who consider 
their performance to be average and an increase in the evaluations of opposite 
poles – great/good versus bad/very bad. On the other hand, the armed forces 
are the institution that traditionally receives the highest positive evaluation, 
increasing from 42% in 2010 to 62% in 2018, the percentage of individuals 
who evaluate their performance as excellent/good. 
Negative evaluations regarding the performance of institutions contribute 
to dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country. That is 
what the opinions in relation to the representative arenas indicate, in particu-
lar, the political parties, for which discontent is widely noticed. In the three 
waves of the ESEB, similar questions were asked about party identification, 
more precisely asking whether citizens like and feel represented by any politi-
cal party. The results of these opinions can be seen in the following Table 3. 
LIKE REPRESENT
2010 (%) 2014 (%) 2018 (%) 2010 (%) 2014 (%) 2018 (%)
Yes 47.7 31.6 15.8 39.2 25.4 27.6
No 51.7 64.5 83.3 57.9 67.8 68.8
DK / NR 0.6 3.9 0.9 2.9 6.8 3.6
Source: ESEB 2010, 2014 and 2018. Questions: “Is there a political party that you like?” 
(2010 and 2014); “Do you consider yourself close to any political party?” (2018); “Is there 
a political party that represents the way you think?”
The data reinforce negative evaluations of the parties. It is noteworthy that 
there is an increase among those who declared that they did not like any party. 
In the survey carried out in 2010, approximately 50% stated that they did not 
like any party, while in 2018, this share rose to 83% of respondents. On the 
other hand, there was a sharp decline of around 30% in the percentage of those 
Table 3. 
 Representation and party 
preference (%)
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who declared that they liked a party in 2018, compared to 2010. Among those 
who declared that they did not feel represented by any party, there was an 
increase of 11 percentage points, in the 2018 round, compared to 2010, with 
approximately 70% of respondents declaring that they did not feel represented 
by any party.
In the survey carried out by ESEB in 2018, questions were also included re-
garding citizens’ trust in the country’s political institutions. Once again, mis-
trust in relation to the parties prevails, with 84.4%, reaching the highest levels 
of distrust, followed by the National Congress with 81.2% and the presidency 
with 70.1%.6
In general, the data show that in the public perception there is a prevalent 
feeling of discreditation and distrust of representative institutions, which in-
creased considerably in the last election analyzed. In the next section, we seek 
to identify how this context of widespread citizen discontent was reflected in 
the last general elections of 2018.
From social to electoral polarization
Never before in its political history had Brazil experienced such a long period 
of democratic institutionality, that is, stability in political competition pat-
terns. However, in a society with little democratic experience and frequently 
used anti-republican practices, as is the case in Brazil, there was an increasing 
skepticism towards parties and government institutions.
The intersection of these elements culminated in the growth of radicalism 
and the intensification of political polarization in society, changing the pattern 
of competition that had prevailed in the previous six presidential elections 
(1994–2014) structured around the dispute between the Workers’ Party (PT) 
versus the Party of Social Brazilian Democracy (PSDB) (Braga, 2010; Limongi 
& Cortez, 2010; Carreirão, 2014), and gave rise to the ascension of the extreme 
right-wing populist candidates like that of Bolsonaro.
Regarding the polarization of society, the ESEB survey asked about the 
ideological self-positioning of voters on a scale from zero to ten, where zero 
represents more to the left and ten more to the right. In 2018, the vast major-
ity, 43%, positioned themselves between seven and ten on the right scale, an 
increase of 16 percentage points in relation to the 2014 survey. On the other 
hand, 20% positioned themselves in the center (between four and six on the 
scale) and approximately 15% positioned themselves between zero and three 
on the scale in the 2018 survey. These results indicate a turn to the right of 
society which was reflected in the elections.
6  These results included the answers little/no trust. The question in the ESEB survey was: 




In the context of an increase in political polarization of the population, the 
traditional center-right parties (mainly MDB and PSDB) had a setback in the 
2018 elections, opening space for “new” competitive political parties – such 
as REDE, Novo and PSL itself –, increasing party fragmentation7. From a sys-
temic point of view, the dynamics of a polarized pluralism, as Sartori (1982) 
defines, with centrifugal tendencies of party competition and high propensity 
to institutional instability, ends up taking over. Under this political context, 
the center loses its capacity to structure electoral preferences, increasing ideo-
logical distances.
At the same time, we observed an increase in electoral uncertainty, caused 
by the Brazilian (economic and political) crisis, but also by an increase in 
the supply of candidates in the 2018 presidential race. Figure 6 below shows 
the evolution of the number of candidates in the presidential elections and 
the Effective Number of Parties (ENP) coefficients for presidential disputes 
throughout the post-88 democratic period.
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
In the 2018 presidential race, PT, to a certain extent, remained as the unit-
ing pole of the left (rivaling PDT). The novelty was the emergence of Bolsonar-
ism, which managed to attract a large part of the votes of the center-right and 
7  In the Congress elected in 2018, Brazil broke its own record of fragmentation, electing 
congressmen from 30 different parties compared to 28 in 2014. In the Senate, there were 15 diffe-
rent parties in 2015 and it turned into 21 different ones in 2019. Currently there are 33 registered 
parties in the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE).
Figure 6. 
Number of Candidates 
and Effective Number of 
Candidates in Presidential 
Elections
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right-wing electorate, as well as of those segments of the center-left that were 
unhappy with the PT government, increasing anti-PT-ism. Nevertheless, the 
ENP of effective candidates for the presidential election has remained stable. 
What gained strength in this election was the ideological polarization, which 
took a turn to the extremes. 
The high degree of uncertainty that marked the 2018 general elections in 
Brazil translated into a strong polarization around the presidential dispute. 
For the first time, a government with representatives of the armed forces – 
president and vice president – was democratically elected in Brazil. The analy-
sis of the results of the first round of the presidential dispute, under the right/
left axis, presented in Table 4, shows the high concentration of voting at the ex-
tremes of the ideological spectrum (92%), in detriment to center candidates.
Left Center Right
PT; PDT; PSOL; PSTU; PPL; REDE PSDB; MDB; PODE PSL; PATRI; DC; NOVO
43.41% valid votes 6.76% valid votes 49.83% valid votes
Source: TSE. Proportion of votes by party in presidential elections: PSL: 46.03; PT: 29.28; 
PDT: 12.47; PSDB 4.76; NOVO: 2.5; PATRI: 1.26; MDB: 1.2; REDE: 1; PODE: 0.8; PSOL: 
0.58; PSTU: 0.05; DC: 0.04; PPL: 0.03.
The influence of Jair Bolsonaro’s candidacy generated a coattail effect on 
other electoral disputes, to the point that many candidates linked their cam-
paign to that of Bolsonaro, in detriment to candidates from the same party. 
As an emblematic example, this phenomenon occurred with the campaign 
of the governor of São Paulo still in the first round. The ex-mayor João Doria 
(PSDB), with “BolsoDoria”, linked his campaign to that of Bolsonaro, then 
leader in voter intentions for the presidential dispute8. 
According to the information in Table 5, in the elections for federal con-
gressmen, in large part, this trend was also replicated, with a concentration of 
votes for the right-wing parties. The coattail effect of the presidential election 
was also felt in the voting of the small party Partido Social Liberal – Social 
Liberal Party – (PSL) for which the then presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro 
ran, becoming the party with the highest number of votes in the 2018 elections 
and also the one that most increased its seats compared to the previous legisla-
ture, skyrocketing from 1 elected congressman in 2014 to 52. 
The 2018 election is an example of what in political science is often called 
a “critical election”, that is, one in which there are significant transformations 
8  Other elected candidates, getting a ride on the Bolsonaro wave were Wilson Witzel, a jud-
ge and political novice, elected to the Rio de Janeiro government by the Christian Social Party, 
and Romeu Zema, businessman and also a novice in elections, elected as governor of Minas 
Gerais by Partido Novo.
Table 4.  
Distribution on the left/right 





Parties Votes (%) Seats (%)
2014 2018 2014 2018
Right 38.4 59.2 41.4 58.6
Center 31.9 15.6 30 15.7
Left 29.7 25.2 28.6 25.7
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
* Note: Parties in the left field: PT, PSB, PDT, PSOL, PC do B, PCB, PMN, PPL PSTU, PCO, 
PV, REDE Center: PSDB, MDB, PTB, PMB, PROS, PPS, SD. Right: DEM, PATRI, PHS, PP, 
PR, PRB, PRP, PSC, PSD, DC, PRN, PRTB, PSL, PT do B / AVANTE, PTC, PTN / PODE, 
NOVO.
Table 5. 
Distribution on the left/
right axis* of valid votes and 
seats in the 2014 and 2018 
elections for the House of 
Congress, by party (%)
in the patterns of party competition in effect until then. Caught in the wake 
of a prolonged crisis (starting with the popular demonstrations of 2013 and 
aggravated by the complaints of corruption revealed by Lava Jato from 2014 
onwards), the 2018 election had an overwhelming impact on the electoral per-
formance of traditional parties by breaking the center of the party system and 
pushing the electorate to extremes in the political spectrum. Meanwhile, the 
right grew electorally. Led by Bolsonaro, it left behind the stain of the “shamed 
right wing”, once associated with the political and economic burden of the 
military regime (1964–1985), and assumed the liberal-conservative agendas, 
which found fertile ground in the 2018 elections, electing the most conserva-
tive Congress in the post-re-democratization period. This right-wing wave 
that has taken over the country is not limited to just a monolithic group but 
finds support in different sectors of society.
In an insightful article, Timothy Power and Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira 
(2019) distinguish four sectors of the Brazilian right. The first, known as po-
litical/clientelist right, is formed by parties and politicians with office-seeking 
motivations, who prioritize participation in government coalitions aimed at 
accessing state resources, regardless of ideologies. This category includes par-
ties with no program commitments, and they are recognized as “Centrão” (Big 
Center), made up of office-seeking parties (PMDB), “parties for rent” from 
right-center (PTB, PR e PP), and tiny parties, usually co-opted by the govern-
ments in office. 
The other three sectors of the right show greater programmatic adherence 
and are identified as the economic right, committed to an agenda of pro-mar-
ket reforms and shrinking of the state; the religious right, identified with evan-
gelical and neo-Pentecostal segments, committed to defending conservative 
moral agendas, such as opposition to abortion and homosexuality; and the 
authoritarian right, which combines a radical defense of law and order with 
a nostalgia for the military regime (Power & Rodrigues-Silveira, 2019, p. 264).
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In the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro got himself elected uniting the last three 
rights – economic, religious, and authoritarian – and explicitly campaigning 
against the political right, reinforcing the “outsider” aspect of his candidacy. 
Paradoxically, while presenting himself with an anti-establishment rheto-
ric, contrary to conventional party politics, Bolsonaro made use of a long 
tradition of parties with weak programmatic commitments, which work as 
personal vehicles, and he was elected by a small party – which he joined 
a few months before the elections. Before that, he had already been in seven 
right-wing parties.
Once elected, Bolsonaro composed his ministerial cabinet mainly with 
former members from the three right-wing sectors that occupy important 
positions, but mainly with military personnel, and refused to negotiate the 
formation of a government coalition and adopt practices associated with what 
he called “traditional politics” or “old politics”. Such modus operandi caused 
numerous problems of political articulation and increased the protagonism of 
Congress in the relationship with the Executive power, which had a low suc-
cess rate in the approval of executive orders sent to Congress and also a high 
proportion of presidential vetoes overturned, which earned him the nickname 
“queen of England”.
Instead of appointing technical members, as he had promised, he formed 
his cabinet of members of the ideological wing given over to radicalism 
(formed by his sons and the astrologer Olavo de Carvalho) and turned to the 
military (retired and active), who began to act as “co-signers” of the govern-
ment that opted for a minority strategy – unprecedented in the Brazilian coali-
tion presidentialism – in the negotiation with Congress. Without a supporting 
coalition, he runs the risk of becoming politically isolated and transforming 
himself into a “lame duck” president. The fact is that not only the absence 
of a coalition with parliament creates a perception that Bolsonaro is a weak 
president. Other examples can be seen in the breaking away from his former 
party, PSL, which occurred when he failed to take command of the party and 
in the plan to found a new party (Alliance for Brazil), which seems more and 
more distant. At the end of his second year in office, worn down by his disas-
trous performance in the health crisis, in a context of increasing unpopularity, 
he turned to acting strategically with parties attracted by the benefits of public 
power, forming a government coalition with greater room for maneuver in the 
Legislative branch. 
To do so, Bolsonaro gets closer to the political right (the so-called “Big 
Center”) and negotiates the nomination of positions in companies and state 
agencies in exchange for support in Congress, in order to ensure his own sur-
vival and prevent a potential impeachment process. However, this approxima-
tion with the parties of the so-called “Big Center” should not occur without 
raising tensions in other sectors of the right and the Bolsonaro’s bases, since 
Bolsonaro himself was elected – and continued after being elected – with 




At the same time that the series of crises contributed to the weakening of 
the president in relation to the other powers, it has also incited tension be-
tween the government branches, with Bolsonaro threating to adopt illiberal 
practices. It should not be underestimated, given that he keeps at the center 
of his government the authoritarian right wing – which is not necessarily the 
military –, openly hostile to institutions and opposition forces.
Finally, another question that is worth highlighting is the high rate of elec-
toral alienation (sum of blank, null or abstention votes), which, in the first round 
of voting of the 2018 presidential elections, reached almost 30% of the electorate, 
i.e., almost one third of eligible voters abstained from choosing of the president. 
These results indicate that, besides the two blocks of polarization in the dispute, 
there is still another “third electoral force’’, composed of those voters who do not 
feel represented by any of the candidates. The figure below shows the evolution 
of voter apathy for first rounds in post-redemocratization presidential races:
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
Figure 7 shows that from 2006 on, electoral alienation rates increased gradu-
ally over the years, even though voting is mandatory. A probable explanation for 
this phenomenon is the dissatisfaction with the political scenario, which faces 
a serious crisis of representation caused, inter alia, by the recurrent involvement 
of the political class in corruption scandals. In this context, it is noteworthy that, 
in a very polarized election like the one in 2018, about one-third of the total 
electorate opted out of choosing the President of the Republic, practically the 
same number of votes that the president-elect received. In view of all this, the 
high rate of electoral alienation seems to have the source in the discontentment 
toward representative institutions seen in the nation’s public opinion.  
Figure 7. 
Evolution of blank, null 
and abstention votes in the 
first rounds of presidential 
elections (1989–2018)
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Performance of traditional parties 
in the 2018 and 2020 elections
Finally in this section, we verify in which direction the Brazilian political re-
gime is going with the ascension of Bolsonarism to power in 2018. Therefore, 
if there is proof of a decline of traditional parties in 2020, we will be able to af-
firm that Bolsonarism was a shift of tectonic plates toward a regime of another 
nature than that of a competitive democracy. If the return of traditional par-
ties in 2020 is seen, we could classify Bolsonarism – at least in its most radical 
form – as what Sérgio Abranches conceptualized as “incidental governments” 
(Abranches, 2020). To this end, we have prepared tables 6 and 7 which com-
pare the performance of traditional parties in the 2018 general elections with 
that achieved by the same political agents in the 2020 municipal elections. 
Traditional parties are those affiliations that have been in the country’s party 
system since the political opening process in the late 1970s. 
The 2018 elections marked changes in relation to previous ones, with 
a strong shift to the right and the collapse of traditional parties that lost 
space in the Senate and Congress (PP, MDB, PSDB, PT, and PTB) and the 
rise of parties that until then had little representation (PSL) and newcomers 
in elections (REDE and NOVO). This effect was repeated, at least in part, in 
the 2020 municipal elections, in which, with the exception of DEM and PP, 
which registered an increase in the number of mayors elected and seats in 
the city councils, all other traditional parties decreased the number of cities 
governed and seats occupied in the city councils, compared to 2016.
The 2020 elections were held in an atypical scenario of health restric-
tions and social isolation resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. The 
best performances were attributed to the right-wing and center-right par-
ties of the ideological spectrum, such as PP and DEM, which significantly 
increased the number of municipalities won in 2020. On the other hand, 
PSDB and MDB were the biggest losers of the executive offices in mu-
nicipalities. In absolute numbers, PSDB (–277) and MDB (–260) were the 
parties that lost the largest number of municipalities compared to 2016. 
Among the parties that are part of the left-wing political spectrum, PT suf-
fered a strong shrinkage since 2016 and, following this downward trend, 
shrunk even more in municipalities and did not elect a mayor in any of the 
country’s capitals.
Although traditional parties have lost seats in Congress and significantly 
decreased the number of elected mayors, parties such as PSDB, MDB, and 
PT are far from becoming irrelevant. As can be seen, in the 2020 elections, 
PSDB and MDB partially recover from the strong electoral setback suffered 
in the 2018 elections, with the MDB being the party that continues to have 
the largest number of elected mayors in Brazil, governing 784 municipalities 
in all. The PSDB, on the other hand, although it lost the largest number of 




ants, in total, about 34 million Brazilians live in municipalities governed by 
the “Toucans”9.
Moreover, the results of the 2020 municipal elections represented impor-
tant defeats for candidates supported by President Bolsonaro, as in the case of 
Celso Russomano (Republicans), who was eliminated from the second round 
of the race for mayor in São Paulo, and Marcello Crivella (Republicans), who 
suffered a crushing defeat in the second round of the race for mayor in Rio 
de Janeiro. The poor performance of the candidates who were linked to Bol-
sonaro and associated with the erratic conduct of the president in dealing with 
the health crisis, contributed to the weakening of Bolsonarism and the loss of 
the president’s prestige. The following tables present the performance of the 
traditional parties in the 2018 national and 2020 municipal elections.
Votes and Seats PP DEM MDB PSDB PT PDT PTB Blank/Null Total
Percentage 
of votes in 
the House of 
Representatives
5.6 4.6 5.5 5.9 10.3 4.7 2.1 18.712.260 98.398.564
Number of 
governors elected 1 2 3 3 4 1 0 21.749.078 27
Number of Senate 
seats 6 6 12 8 6 4 3 81
Number of 
seats in the 
Federal House of 
Representativ-es 
38 29 34 29 54 28 10 513
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
 
Votes and seats PP DEM MDB PSDB PT PDT PTB Blank/Null Total
Percentage of 
votes for mayor 7.5 8.3 10.7 10.5 6.8 5.2 2.6 10.969.405 100.879.416
Number of 
elected mayors 685 466 784 522 183 314 216 5.568
Percentage of 
votes for city 
councilmen in 
the city council
7.4 6.6 8.5 6.6 5.6 5.4 3.8 10.138.845 1 02.802.066
Number of 
seats in the city 
council 
6172 4187 7109 4270 2575 3326 2375 58.114
Source: elaborated on the basis of TSE data.
9  The figure of a toucan is the symbol/mascot of PSDB.
Table 6. 
Performance of traditional 
parties in the general 
elections of 2018 (Brazil)
Table 7. 
Performance of traditional 
parties in municipal elections 
of 2020 (Brazil)
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The first important observation from these results is that from one election 
to the next there was relative continuity in electoral support for the parties. 
When we bear in mind the total number of valid votes, there was even an in-
crease in the electorate that opted for a political party when casting their bal-
lots. Although voting continues to be mandatory in our context, the choice of 
a party is one way of expressing society’s electoral preferences. But even with 
all the process of erosion and disorganization experienced in recent years, 
Brazilian political parties maintain a significant margin of allegiance by the 
national electorate. 
A second important aspect to note is that, among the older parties, those 
on right of the ideological political spectrum, DEM and PP, and center-right, 
PSDB and MDB, increased their electoral political power considerably in the 
2020 election. While the parties on the left, PT and PDT, decreased the margin 
of electoral support and, consequently, control of political positions. There was, 
therefore, a return of conservative forces to political control of the country. 
It is important to emphasize that the Brazilian right-wing segment concen-
trates the oldest parties, under different names, but long standing in national 
politics. It is the political family that has persisted from the Imperial Age to the 
Sixth Republic (1985 onwards). Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power (2000) 
show that the success of the conservative parties in maintaining political pow-
er in much of this period is related to the strategy of conciliation with civilian 
and military groups at the head of the government coalition at the national 
level, to the extent that they will remain in power even if in alliance with the 
forces that were politically opposed to them. Specifically concerning the last 
democratic transition process, Hagopian (1996), O’Donnel (1996) and Souza 
(1989) point out that the absence of a rupture between the 1964–1985 au-
thoritarian regime and the so-called New Republic resulted in the continuity 
of the conservative political elites in charge of the reorganization of the new 
democratic order. 
As was the case in the electoral results in the United States with the victory 
of Democrat Joe Biden, the growth of right-wing and center-right parties in 
the 2020 Brazilian municipal elections are indicative that, despite the analyti-
cal merit of the mentioned literature on the possibility of internal corrosion of 
democracies, the thesis regarding incidental rulers was evident in the United 
States and has strong indications that the same evidence will be seen in Brazil.
Final considerations
In the face of the critical election of 2018, the traditional right parties, associ-
ated with the political establishment, displayed resilience and were victorious 
in the 2020 municipal elections. Even though municipal elections do not have 
a decisive impact on the national one, past trends can pave the way for the 




tarian government, elected in 2018 to command the fourth largest democracy 
in the world, raise an alert about the need to maintain constant vigilance.
The 2018 elections consecrated an extreme right-wing candidate as presi-
dent of the world’s fourth largest democracy. If, on the one hand, his victory, 
legitimized at the polls, is proof of the consolidation of the democratic system 
in the country, on the other hand, it has sparked fear of a democratic regression.
This fear is justified when we consider that Bolsonaro has met all four 
requirements proposed by Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) to identify potential 
authoritarian rulers: rejection of or weak commitment to the rules of the dem-
ocratic game; denial of the legitimacy of opponents; tolerance and encour-
agement of violence; willingness to restrict the civil liberties of opponents, 
including the media. In his 28 years as a congressman, Bolsonaro has become 
notable for his extreme positions and authoritarian bias, with controversial 
statements not rarely associated with hate speech, disparaging “minorities” 
(women, LGBT, blacks, and indigenous people) and apology to military dic-
tatorship and torture (Sponholz, Christofoletti, 2019; Smith, 2020). As noted 
above, the divisive ethos, widely exploited during his campaign, has lasted dur-
ing the government, which has always been prone to crises and always finds 
itself in a constant tug-of-war against the Legislative and Judiciary branches.
In the midst of the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro 
continued to instigate the polarization of society, encouraging participation 
in pro-government demonstrations and against other branches, ignoring the 
recommendations of health authorities. Hostility against political institutions 
and irresponsibility are characteristic of populist-authoritarian politicians, 
both from the right and the left.
Therefore, a dilemma the democratic process faces is that free and fair 
elections can elect extremist demagogues who are not committed to institu-
tional limits. This dilemma was emphasized by Fareed Zakaria, in an article 
written in 1997, in which he coined the term “illiberal democracy” to refer 
to countries – especially Latin American and Eastern European countries 
– whose transition to democracy retains traces of the authoritarian period. 
In the author’s words:
Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or 
reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits 
on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms. 
(Zakaria, 1997, p. 22)
This phenomenon is extremely challenging since it is the democratic 
mechanisms of popular elections that allow leaders with authoritarian profiles 
to come to power (Zakaria, 1997; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). When elected, 
such leaders subvert the laws for their own benefit, raising the liberal deficit 
and undermining the system of checks and balances, putting the regime at risk 
of going down the path of illiberal democracies.
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For the first time since the re-democratization, Brazil elected an ultra-
rightist as president of the Republic. In this sense, it has come closer to coun-
tries such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, which have elected extreme right-
wing populist rulers. As if all the extremist outbursts of President Bolsonaro 
were not enough, the large number of amendments – and repeals – of decrees 
and provisional measures have deleterious effects, as they allow the Executive 
to legislate without the participation of the Legislative branch. In fact, democ-
racy has never been his north. As president, he has further intensified the 
polarization present in society – as if he were in a permanent campaign – and 
has been testing institutions and contributing to the corrosion of accountabil-
ity mechanisms. But unlike his far-right counterparts in European countries 
– such as Polish President Andrzej Duda and, especially, Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán – Bolsonaro does not have the popular and congress 
support necessary to transform the country into an “illiberal democracy”.
According to Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), for the preservation of democ-
racy, in addition to official rules, political agents must commit to respecting 
the informal rules of “mutual toleration”, which means recognizing politi-
cal rivals as legitimate, and of “institutional forbearance”, which refers to the 
need for parsimony in the use of legal attributions that, at their extremes, may 
undermine democratic principles. In this case, challenges to electoral results 
and impeachment proceedings reveal fragile institutional forbearance. The 
opposite of institutional forbearance is to play the politics of “constitutional 
hardball”, when institutions are tested to the limit, generating deep animosity 
among party adversaries. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) assign political parties 
the responsibility of preventing the emergence of extremist leaders and select-
ing candidates who respect democratic rules. On this point, the authors are 
adamant: “political parties are democracy’s gatekeepers”.
With regard to the Brazilian case, the situation of the party system, disor-
ganized by the 2018 elections and still integrated by a large number of parties 
that have little representation and limited agendas, is quite challenging. Add to 
this the incentives for candidates to run for ad hoc parties, which function as 
mere vehicles for promoting their personal careers. One can see the president 
of the Republic without a party. In turn, these practices are endemic to party 
institutionalization, because they cause candidates to place themselves above 
the parties, seeking legitimacy outside the organizations, which generates in-
centives for individualism and the proliferation of new parties.
We have long known that populist autocrats use political polarization and 
partisan intolerance to weaken democracy. As a response to this scenario, Bra-
zilian parties have an essential role not only in promoting tolerance and insti-
tutional forbearance, but especially in democratizing social, racial, and gender 
issues if they truly desire to continue managing social conflicts. After all, Brazil 
reached the 21st century with a relatively stable democracy in terms of the pro-
cedures that regulate political competition, the change of political groups in the 




figuration of a multi-party system, and the expansion of the electoral civil duty. 
But, at the same time, it presents deficits of representativity of major population 
segments, such as women, who represent more than 52% of the national elector-
ate, but currently occupy only 15% of the seats in the House of Representatives 
and 16% in the Senate. With regard to social requirements, the country has not 
advanced enough to democratize the access of the majority of the population to 
social welfare policies, deepening inequality in the distribution of income, edu-
cation, and health, thus increasing the barriers between social classes.
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